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ABSTRACT
Secondary schooling experienced incredible growth in the first 40 years of the 20
th Century. Was
legislation on compulsory attendance and child labor responsible for this growth? Using individual data
from the 1960 census, I estimate the effect of several laws on educational attainment for individuals who
were 14 years old between 1915 and 1939. The results show that legally requiring a child to attend school
for one more year, either by increasing the age required to obtain a work permit or by lowering the
entrance age, increased educational attainment by about 5%. The effect was similar for white males and
females, but there was no effect for blacks. Continuation school laws, which required working children
to attend school on a part time basis, were effective for white males only. These laws increased the
education only of those in the lower percentiles of the distribution of education. By increasing the
education of the lower tail, the laws contributed to the decrease in educational inequality, perhaps by as
much as 15%. States with more wealth and a higher percentage of immigrants were more likely to pass
more stringent laws, and states with higher percentage of blacks were less likely to do so. Importantly,







  In the first half of the 20
th century, secondary schooling in the U.S. experienced 
incredible growth: the percentage of young adults with high school degrees increased by a 
factor of five from 1910 to 1940 (Goldin and Katz, 1997). Many factors help explain this 
unprecedented increase in educational attainment. The demand for educated workers had 
increased as a result of the increase of white collars jobs (Goldin and Katz, 1998). The 
demand for young labor had fallen as immigrants came to the U.S.. And agricultural wages 
had decreased because of technological changes in agriculture (Osterman, 1980). This 
resulted in lowered labor demand in the agricultural sector, which employed a significant 
number of young workers.
1 Some states also wanted to increase education for other reasons, 
often correlated with state income and state homogeneity (Goldin and Katz, 1997). During 
this period, there was also an enormous amount of legislation geared toward increasing 
school attendance and curbing child labor.
2 The purpose of this paper is to answer the 
question of whether state compulsory attendance and child labor laws contributed to the 
increase in educational attainment from 1914 to 1939. 
With one exception (Schmidt, 1996), no one has analyzed the impact of these laws 
during this period
3—the most important years in the expansion of secondary education, when 
compulsory attendance laws are most likely to have affected many people.  This paper 
contributes to the literature by analyzing a detailed set of laws, examining their effect on the 
entire distribution of education, analyzing the factors that led to legislative changes in the 
laws during this period, and testing for the endogeneity of the laws.  
                                                           
1 In 1910, 72% of children 10-15 years of age engaged in gainful occupations were employed in agriculture 
(Bureau of the Census, 1924). 
2 The number of changes for 1915-1939 will be analyzed in the next section. 
3 Acemoglu and Angrist (1999) and Lang and Kropp (1986) included this period in their data, but they analyze 
the impact of the laws over a much larger span of time.   2
The results (using individual census data from 1960) show that laws requiring a child 
to attend school for one more year increased educational attainment by about 18 days,
4 and 
decreased educational inequality. Importantly, the results also suggest that the laws were not 
endogenous during this period, in the sense that compulsory attendance and child labor laws 
appear to have caused education to increase, not vice-versa.
5  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 1 contains a short description of the 
history of compulsory attendance and child labor laws, and it reviews previous studies in this 
area and describes the strategy pursued in this study. Section 2 describes the data. The 
econometric strategy and the results using individual-level results are in Section 3. Section 4 
looks at the factors that explain the passage of the laws. Section 5 analyzes the effects on the 
distribution of education. The endogeneity tests are presented in Section 6 and Section 7 
concludes. 
1. What do we know about compulsory attendance and child labor laws? 
Compulsory attendance laws were first enacted by Massachusetts in 1852.
6 By 1918 
all states had such laws. From their early inception (and to this day) the laws were complex.
7 
They varied greatly across states in their specifications and enforcement.  
Compulsory attendance laws specified a minimum and a maximum age between 
which attendance was required, and the minimum period of attendance. They also provided 
penalties and procedures for non-compliance and listed the conditions under which 
individuals could be exempted from attending school. Exemptions were given for a variety of 
                                                           
4 Although they might not have decreased employment. For example see Moehling (1999), Goldin (1979).  
5 Endogeneity here refers to econometric endogeneity. The argument is that the laws did not result from 
increases in education or any other variable that explains both. 
6 Earlier legislation on compulsory education existed in many states (the first compulsory education law was 
enacted by Massachusetts in 1642 -- see Katz or Kotin et al.). Compulsory attendance laws forced parent to 
send their children to school, not just to provide them with an education. 
7 See Kotin and Aikman (1980).   3
reasons, including achievement of a certain level of education (e.g. the completion of eighth 
grade), mental or physical disability, distance from school, poverty, and lack of schools.  
The most important exemption was that, under certain conditions, children were 
allowed to get work permits and leave school at an early age, generally lower than the 
dropout age specified by compulsory attendance laws. Child labor laws, which extensively 
regulated the employment of minors, were in place in all states by 1914.
8  
Child labor laws and compulsory attendance laws were often not “coordinated” in the 
sense that each specified different requirements for leaving school. For example, in 1924 in 
Pennsylvania the ages for compulsory attendance were 8 to 16, but a child could be excused 
after completing the 8
th grade. Child labor laws in that state however allowed 14 year-olds 
with 6 years of education to get work permits. Continuation school laws, which forced 
children at work to continue their education on a part-time basis, were the only laws that 
attempted to bridge the gap between labor and attendance laws. 
There is little agreement regarding the effectiveness of these laws. Stigler (1950) first 
noted that although enrollments were higher in states with higher minimum compulsory ages 
in 1940, the relationship broke down when he classified states by per capita income and 
racial composition. Landes and Solomon (1972) analyze the impact of the laws on attendance 
from 1880 to 1910. They find that compulsory education laws did not contribute to the 
increase in enrollments during this period. They further suggest that states with higher 
enrollments were more likely to pass more restrictive laws than other states. Eisenberg 
(1988) shows that attendance levels and expenditures per school-aged child were important 
factors in explaining the passage of the compulsory attendance laws from 1870 to 1915.  
                                                           
8 These laws also included several conditions for the granting of the permits, such as educational requirements, 
and exceptions under which those not meeting the general requirements could obtain permits.    4
But none of these papers focuses on the 1914-1939 period, when the laws are most 
likely to have affected many. Also, research in other social sciences has found that during the 
preceding period (up to 1915) the laws were ineffective,
9 but that the relevant laws were 
enforced by the 1920s.
10 Stigler (1950) and Edwards (1978) do look at the impact of the laws 
on enrollments from 1940 to 1960 and conclude that they were not effective, but there is little 
time-variation in the laws after the war, whereas there were many legislative changes from 
1914 to 1939 (see next section).  
There are a number of studies that find that the laws were effective. Schmidt (1996) 
finds large effects of compulsory education laws on the probability of high school 
completion between 1920 and 1934. Lang and Kropp (1986), using data from 1908 to 1970, 
show that compulsory education laws affect enrollments, even for groups not targeted by the 
laws. Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) find that the effects of the laws on educational 
attainment are positive and significant, the effects of child labor laws being larger. The two 
latter studies, although covering many decades, do not control for time- and state-specific 
variables, so their results could be biased. 
Two studies, Margo and Finegan (1996) and Angrist and Krueger (1991), use a 
significantly different methodology to assess the impact of the laws: since the laws specified 
the age at which children could leave school, those children born earlier in the year would 
obtain fewer years of schooling. Using this natural experiment, Angrist and Krueger (1991) 
                                                           
9 The United States Commissioner of Education said in 1886 that “in many instances (…) the compulsory 
education law, if not actually dead letter, is practically so.” Many state laws did not provide enforcement 
mechanisms, and if they did, they often lacked enforcement means. See Katz (1976) and Ensign (1921). 
10 Historians and lawyers believe that compulsory attendance laws were enforced by 1920. Most states instituted 
school censuses to count the school population and assess the needs of each district. Truant officers ensured that 
children were in school and fined parents in case of non-compliance. Also, expenditures in education increased 
(See Tyack, 1974 and Katz, 1976). Note however the laws might not have been enforced in all states: Margo 
(1986) reports that in Alabama expenditures on enforcement were low and that “teachers cited non-enforcement 
of attendance laws as a major weakness in Alabama schools”.   5
compare attendance rates by state, cohort and quarter of birth between 1960 and 1980; Margo 
and Finegan (1996) make similar analyses using the more detailed information on month of 
birth available in the 1900 census. Both studies find that the laws were effective, but there 
has been controversy about whether quarter (month) of birth affects education only because 
of compulsory schooling laws.
11 
This paper provides new evidence on these laws. In particular I make use of the fact 
that the laws were complex and were likely to work in combination with one another. I 
analyze the factors that resulted in changes in compulsory schooling and child labor 
legislation, and include a very rich set of controls for state characteristics that potentially 
affected both education and the passage of these laws for this period. More importantly, I 
look at the effect of the laws on the entire distribution of education, not only at the effect on 
average education or enrollments. If these laws were effective they would affect only those at 
the lower end of the distribution of education, thereby lowering education inequality. And I 
explore the issue of whether the laws increased educational attainment rather than resulting 
from high education levels. These results therefore support the use of compulsory schooling 
and child labor laws as instruments for education.
12 Note that I concentrate on the effect of 
the laws on completed years of education rather than on attendance or enrollments because 
education is the more important social outcome.  
2. Data Description and Sources 
The data on compulsory attendance and child labor laws were collected from multiple 
sources. Eight years of state-level data (1915, 1918, 1921, 1924, 1928, 1930, 1935 and 1939) 
on these laws were collected. Some additional information was available for other years. I 
                                                           
11 See Bound and Jaeger (1996). 
12 For papers that use these laws as instruments see Acemolgu and Angrist (2000) and Lleras-Muney (2001).   6
imputed missing observations by using the older values. The information was not 
consistently recorded by a single agency. In case of conflicting pieces of data, the later 
information was used to correct the data.
13 The data contain information on the maximum 
age by which a child must enter school (entrance age), the minimum age at which he can 
dropout of school (dropout age), the minimum level of education required to be exempted 
from school (education to dropout), the minimum age required to obtain a work permit and 
leave school (work permit age), the minimum education level required to obtain a work 
permit (education to work), and information on whether working children were required to 
go to school on a part time basis (continuation school).  
Following Acemoglu and Angrist (2000), I constructed two additional variables. The 
first one, childlaw is defined as work permit age minus entrance age. Childlaw is a measure 
of the number of years a person would have to attend school if he entered school at the age 
that compulsory attendance laws required and left as soon as he reached the age necessary to 
obtain a labor permit. For example, in a given state in 1935, an individual must start school at 
age 7 and may get a work permit at 15; childlaw would be equal to 8 years in this case. If 
there was no law, the value for childlaw is set to 0. The second variable, comlaw is defined as 
the number of years a person was forced to go to school if both the entrance and the dropout 
age specified by compulsory attendance laws were enforced (i.e. leaving age minus entrance 
age).  
National trends for these laws can be assessed by looking at graphs in Table 1. These 
trends reflect a relatively large number of overall changes in legislation: 20 states changed 
their continuation schools laws at least once, 25 states changed the entrance age at least once, 
                                                           
13 See Appendix A for more details.   7
30 changed leaving age at least once, 29 changed work permit age at least once. The same is 
true for the other aspects of the laws. 
Overall, the laws tended to require more attendance over time, although it was not 
always the case that states passed laws that required more years of education.
14 Also the 
timing of the increases was different for each law.
15 The education required to obtain a labor 
permit and the education required to be exempted from school increased overtime, but they 
both fell short of matching the implicit number of years of schooling required by compulsory 
attendance and/or child labor laws.  
These trends for national averages conceal a great deal of cross-sectional variation in 
any given year however. To illustrate this other type of variation I present tabulations of the 
laws in three different years (1915, 1928 and 1939) in Table 2.  
These data on compulsory education are matched to census data, from the Integrated 
Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) 1960 census 1% sample.
16 The Census provides 
information on sex, race, state-of-residence, state-of-birth, age and whether parents are 
foreign born. I kept all individuals that were 14 years of age in the 48 states between 1914 
and 1939 (i.e. those born between 1901 and 1925 in the U.S.), except for those with missing 
values on their education variable (highest grade completed). Occasionally I also use the 
                                                           
14 For example, Louisiana changed the age at which a child could leave school from 16 in 1915, down to 14 in 
1916, back up to 16 in 1921, back down to 14 in 1923, back up again to 15 in 1930, and down again to 14 in 
1935! 
15 The average age at which a child must enter school decreased constantly throughout the period. Laws related 
to continuation school were mostly implemented in the early 20s and remained mostly unchanged thereafter. 
Changes related to the education required for a labor permit were implemented in the late 20s, but the education 
necessary to be exempted from school increased also in the late 30s. The age required for a labor permit 
changed significantly both in the early 20s and late 30s.  
16 The data comes from the IPUMS 1960 general sample and was downloaded from the web site 
http://www.ipums.umn.edu   8
1950 census, which however contains fewer observations and was therefore not used for the 
main results.
17 
I matched each individual to the laws that were in place in their state-of-birth
18 when 
they were 14 years old. I chose this age because that is the lowest common denominator for 
minimum leaving ages across states.
19 Schmidt (1996) tested this assumption and found the 
effect of the laws was largest when looking at age 14. 
Finally, I also match individuals with characteristics of their state-of-birth when they 
were 14. The state-level data include state expenditures on education, number of school-
buildings per acre, percent of the population that was living in urban areas, percent of the 
white population that was foreign born, percent of the population that was black, percent of 
the population employed in manufacturing, average annual wages in manufacturing per 
worker, average value of farm property per acre, and number of doctors per capita. Again, 
these data were collected from multiple sources and imputed for the years in which there 
were missing values.
20 The summary statistics for the data are presented in Appendix C. 
3. Econometric Model and Results  
For each individual I estimate the following equation: 
EDics = β Xics  + δ CLcs + µ Zcs + αc + γs + Rrc + εics ,   (1) 
                                                           
17 The 1920 and 1940 censuses were not used for several reasons. The 1920 census is not very appealing 
because I can only look at a few cohorts (those that were 14 between 1915 and 1920).  Also note that the 
outcome variable that I use is completed years of education. This variable would be censored for most 
individuals in the 1920 census and for many individuals in 1940 as well. Additionally, in 1940 there are very 
few sample lines for the analysis.  
18 This matching procedure assumes that individuals went to school in the state where they were born. 
Inevitably some individuals were mismatched. However Card and Krueger (1992) showed that mobility during 
the first half of the 20
th century was low and that the error that this procedure generates is small, around 10%. 
Furthermore, if such an error exists, it likely will be uncorrelated with laws on compulsory attendance and with 
child labor laws, because these laws were probably not the reason why individuals moved across states. Indeed 
if I regress mobility between state-of-birth and state-of-residence in 1960 as a function of education, 
compulsory education laws, and all other covariates used in this paper, I find that the laws are not significant. 
The F-statistic of joint significance of the laws has a value of 1.17 (p value of 0.3151). 
19 With the exception of North Carolina (1915-1917) and Virginia (1915-1922).   9
where ED is the number of years of education for individual i, of cohort c, born in state s, in 
region r; Xics is a vector of individual characteristics, such as sex and race; CL is a vector of 
compulsory education and child labor laws in state s for cohort c; Zcs are state of birth 
characteristics at age 14; αc are cohort effects; γs are state effects; Rrc are region- and cohort-
specific effects; and εics is the error term. The errors are clustered at the state-of-birth and 
cohort level, and they are corrected for heteroskedasticity using White’s estimator. All the 
regressions reported here include state and cohort effects. Thus, the effect of the laws is 
identified from variations in the laws within states over time. 
The results are presented in table 3. In regression 1, I include childlaw, and a dummy 
variable equal to one if the state had a continuation school law. The coefficient on childlaw is 
about 5 percentage points. Thus an increase in childlaw of one raises educational attainment 
by about 18 days. The coefficient on continuation school is also about 5%, but it is 
insignificant. The F-statistics on the joint significance of these two variables is highly 
significant.  
Regression 2 adds a variable that contains the level of education necessary to obtain a 
work permit (education to work). This variable turns out to be insignificant. Its addition does 
not change the coefficients of the other laws, and it lowers the value of the F-statistic of the 
joint significance of the laws. In regression 3, I decompose childlaw into its two components: 
the age at which a child had to enter school (entrance age) and the age at which he could get 
a work permit and leave school (work permit age). The coefficients of both variables are 
significant at the 5% level. I test whether the coefficient on entry age is the same in absolute 
value as that of work age. The test does not reject the null at a 5% level.
21 This result has an 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
20 See Appendix B for more details. 
21 The test for equality is still not rejected if education requirements are not included.    10
interesting public policy implication. Historically it was difficult to pass legislation to 
increase the work permit age.
22 The result implies that it is possible to increase educational 
attainment by lowering the entrance age, which might be more politically feasible and easier 
to implement than increasing the work permit age (although the payoff, in terms of human 
capital, might be different). 
Regressions 4 through 6 repeat all the estimations above but use the age at which an 
individual was allowed to drop out of school according to the compulsory attendance laws 
(dropout age) rather than the age at which he could get a work permit. Also I replace the 
education required for a work permit with the education required to dropout from school 
according to compulsory attendance laws. None of the variables are significant, except for 
the age at which an individual must enter school.  
Table 4 contains a number of specification checks. Column 1 shows the results only 
for states where the number of compulsory years of schooling is positive. The coefficient is 
still significant (in fact increases) suggesting that it was the changes in existing laws rather 
than introduction of new laws that were responsible for the increases in education. Columns 
2 and 3 address the issue of measurement error in the laws. Column 2 shows the results 
restricting the sample to the 8 cohorts for which no imputation in the laws has been done. 
The results from restricting the sample to those that are still living in their state-of-birth in 
1960 are in Column 3. In both cases the coefficient of childlaw is statistically identical to that 
in Table 2, suggesting these sources of error are not very important. Finally in column 4, I re-
estimate the model using the 1950 census. The results using the 1960 census cross section are 
                                                           
22 Between 1914 and 1938 the movement to make child labor law federal encountered opposition from the 
southern states and from the Supreme Court which found the federal child labor bills of 1916 and 1918 
unconstitutional. It was not until 1938 that child labor laws were made federal, in spite of the opposition of 
manufacturer, farmers and textile interests. (Kotin and Aikman). One of the main features of the federal law is   11
derived from synthetic cohort variation, rather than real cohort variation. This can be 
problematic if for example individuals die non-randomly. The results however, suggest that 
that the synthetic cohort approach is not generating any bias. 
In all cases the estimate of the effect of the laws (5%) is similar to those reported by 
other researchers. Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) report an increase of between 1 and 6 
percentage points. Angrist and Krueger (1991) find that the impact of the laws was about 4% 
in 1960. Eisenberg (1988) finds an effect of about 2%.  
Finally I analyze the effects of the laws by race and gender. There is reason to believe 
that these education policies might have affected groups in different ways. For example, 
researchers have suggested that the quality of education during the 20
th century was very 
different for blacks.
23 If the laws had a differential impact, they might help explain the 
evolution of gender and race gaps. The results are presented in Table 5. As in Margo (1990), 
I find that the laws had no impact on blacks.
24 It is unclear why this is the case. It is possible 
that blacks faced much lower returns to education,
25 so that even when confronted with 
penalties it was still better to work than to attend school. It is also possible that law 
enforcement did not concern itself with this group; i.e. that these laws were never meant to 
affect blacks. Most probably however, blacks were very likely to be exempted by law due to 
the lack of schools and school resources (also because blacks were more likely to be poor). 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
that it made the work permit age 16, rather than 14, which was the most common value across states during the 
period. 
23 See Card and Krueger (February 1992), Margo (1990). 
24This result calls into question previous findings in the literature that argue that quarter of birth can predict 
education only because of its interaction with compulsory schooling laws. Those papers find that quarter of 
birth affected educational attainment for blacks, but the results here suggest the laws did not affect them 
(although note that Margo (1990) does find effects of the laws for blacks, but these become insignificant when 
state dummies are included). 
25 Welch (1973) presents evidence that the returns to education were indeed very low for blacks in this period.   12
Indeed in the segregated South, there were relatively few black schools.
26 There is also 
evidence that the South generally allocated very limited funds to black schools, and that 
those resources were diverted from black to white schools.
27  
Note that the laws affected white males and females equally except for continuation 
school laws, which only affected males (males in states with continuation school laws 
obtained about 9% more education). Since males had more working opportunities than 
females in this period, they were more likely than females to have obtained a work permit 
and to be bound by continuation school laws.  
The results by gender are interesting for another reason. The 1960 sample might 
suffer from selection issues, especially for men. For example it might be the case that men 
with more education were more (or less) likely to die during World War II. Also, war 
veterans greatly benefited from the GI Bill, which provided financial incentives to go back to 
school. In order to assess whether the laws are correlated with veteran experience, I estimate 
the likelihood of being a veteran (for white males only) using a probit model. Controlling for 
education and all the other state and cohort covariates used in this paper, I find that 
compulsory schooling laws do not predict veteran status.
28 Results using only whites in the 
1950 census—the Korean War having just begun—are identical(see column 4 of table 4). 
Finally note that the fact that the coefficients are similar and significant for men and women 
separately confirms that the war and the post-war events are not a significant source of 
selection. This is consistent with Bound et al. (1999), who also found that the effects of the 
GI Bill on educational attainment were small.  
                                                           
26 There were only 64 public high schools in the entire South for black children (from Thomas Jesse Jones, as 
cited in  Margo, 1990, p. 20) 
27 See Card and Krueger (1996), and Margo (1990). 
28 The coefficient on the laws are small and insignificant at the 10% level.   13
4. Why were the laws changed during this period?  
An important question that arises in interpreting these results is: why did the laws 
change? There are potentially many explanations. One important explanation is that the laws 
resulted from high levels of education (rather than causing them). Higher enrollment levels 
facilitate the passage of the laws, since they would encounter less opposition. The laws 
would affect fewer individuals and expenditures would not have to rise by much as a 
consequence. We expect therefore that those economic factors that affected education (such 
as immigration levels, see the introduction) also made the passage of the laws more likely.  
Political forces also might affect the passage of the laws. Arguments in the case of 
Pierce v. the Society of Sisters (1925)
29 and in Meyer v. Nebraska (1923)
30 suggest that the 
politics of compulsory education in the early 20
th century are very similar to those in the 19
th 
century.
31 Those who supported legislation believed that universal education was necessary 
to promote democracy and to guarantee a common American culture for all, including 
different immigrant groups, races, and religions. In addition education would lower crime, 
racism, and inequality, and was necessary for economic growth. These arguments suggest a 
few reasons why individuals at the lower end of the distribution of education did not choose 
to obtain higher levels of education: individuals did not anticipate the increases in the returns 
to education, nor did they perceive the social returns to education, whereas legislators did.
32 
                                                           
29 In this case, the Supreme Court found Oregon’s law that all children ages 8 to 16 attend public schools 
unconstitutional. 
30 In this case, the Supreme Court declared Nebraska’s 1919 law that all instruction be in English 
unconstitutional. 
31 See Eisenberg (1988) and Butts and Cremin (1953) for a thorough description of the arguments in the 19
th 
century. I found no articles that discuss these issues for compulsory schooling laws for 1914-1939. 
32 It is also possible that there were liquidity constraints. See Card (1995).   14
In the case of child labor legislation, the main opposition came from the southern states,
 
textile industries, manufacturer’s associations, and farmer’s organizations.
33  
I predict the changes in the laws as a function of average education level at the state 
and cohort level, state characteristics, region dummies, state effects, cohort effects and 
region*cohot effects. As expected, I find (Table 6) that higher wealth (measured by the value 
of farm per acre) and higher percentages of the immigrant population resulted in more 
stringent schooling requirements, whereas higher percentage of blacks resulted in lower 
requirements. This last variable is probably a proxy for southern agricultural states. Higher 
urbanization affected the entrance age and continuation school passage, but not work permit 
ages. Unlike Eisenberg, I find that higher per capita expenditures on education did not result 
in more stringent laws (they are significant only for entrance age, but then they have the 
wrong sign). Also note that neither manufacturing wages nor the percentage employed in 
manufacturing had an impact on the laws, which is consistent with the literature which 
suggests that it was agriculture rather than manufacturing that opposed the passage of the 
laws.  
Like Eisenberg, I find that education levels
34 in these regressions affected work 
permit ages (at the 10% level) and the constructed variable childcom, suggesting indeed there 
is some potential endogeneity in the previous section. All of the factors that could potentially 
explain the passage of the laws were included when looking at the impact of the laws on 
attainment. Their inclusion did not affect the coefficient on the laws much,
35 suggesting that 
                                                           
33 These groups successfully delayed the passage of federal labor legislation by about 20 years.  See Lescohier 
and Brandeis (1966) pp. 440-450, Kotin and Aikman (1980) pp. 57-64.  
34 Note that education here refers to the average education level eventually obtained by a given cohort as 
measured in 1960. Alternatively one can use enrollment levels at the time, but that data was not collected for 
this project. Is is unclear that enrollments would be a better control, since education captures both enrollments 
and in a sense, projected enrollments, which are just as important.  
35 Results available upon request.   15
(on the basis of observables) the endogeneity might not be an important issue. The next two 
sections however will address this issue more in depth, first by looking at the effect of the 
laws on the entire distribution and then by testing for endogeneity more directly by looking at 
the timing of the laws. 
5. Effect of the laws on the distribution of education 
There are a few mechanisms through which compulsory schooling may have affected 
the distribution of education. The standard human capital model predicts that the laws would 
affect only those below the required level of education; individuals obtaining more than the 
required level of schooling would not be affected at all. If binding, the laws should have 
increased average education and decreased educational inequality by increasing the 
attainment of the lower percentiles of education (Chiswick, 1969).  
Additionally, Lang and Kropp (1986) suggested that if individuals at lower levels of 
education stayed in school because of the laws, then even those not targeted by the laws 
might have increased their schooling in an effort to differentiate themselves from the bottom 
(signaling theory of education). So the laws would shift the distribution of education to the 
right. Note that the shift is most likely smaller at higher levels of education,
36 so this 
hypothesis also implies a lower level of inequality.   
Finally, if there are option value effects, those that are forced to obtain the required 
level of schooling might continue their education beyond what the law prescribes, because 
they now have the option to do so (for example, those that are forced to finish secondary 
school can now decide to go on to get a high school degree). The distribution of education 
would therefore be compressed even more than the human capital theory would predict. 
                                                           
36 Lang and Kropp argue that this will be the case if education costs increase at higher levels of education.   16
Note that the effects on the distribution of education are also suggestive about 
whether the laws are endogenous or not. A finding that the laws affected all the percentiles of 
the distribution of education would certainly suggest that the laws are endogenous (e.g. if the 
entire distribution of education is shifting up only because of increased returns to education, 
laws forcing children to stay in school are easily passed, and they might appear to affect all 
percentiles). On the other hand, a finding that the laws only affect the lower percentiles of the 
distribution is consistent with a model where the laws were enforced and had effects for 
some children. And less likely to be the result of endogeneity.  
As preliminary evidence I plot the evolution of the percentiles of the distribution 
throughout this period. As can be observed in graph A, the highest increases in education 
were at the lower percentiles of education. I look now at the effect of the laws on the 
different percentiles of the distribution of education by estimating regressions where the 
dependent variable is a given percentile of the distribution for a given state and cohort. I use 
OLS for a panel of state- and cohort- specific observations  (1200 observations derived from 
the 1960 census, using only whites). As can be seen in Panel A of Table 7 the effect of 





th percentiles, but not for 
the higher percentiles (except for the 90
th percentile). The effect is strongest for the 40
th 
percentile and it declines for higher percentiles. The 10
th to 40
th percentiles vary from 5.5 to 
11 years of education (again refer to Graph A). The implicit years of education in the laws 
(as coded in childlaw) were most commonly 6, 7, 8 and 9 (see tabulations in Table 2), so this 
result is consistent with the idea that compulsory education and child labor laws were 
effective. The fact that the laws affected the 50
th percentile can be understood as evidence for 
the signaling theory of education, as well as for the “option value” theory.   17
Alternatively I ran the regressions using the percentage of individuals with a given 
level of education or less in a given state and cohort. The results (Table 7, Panel B) show that 
the laws lowered the percentage of individuals obtaining 10 or less years of schooling (the 
largest effect is for 8 and 9 years of schooling). But the effect remains stable or falls if I 
include those with 11 years of education or more. Results in both Panels of Table 7 suggest 
the laws were effective at and around the age specified by the laws, consistent with the 
effects predicted by the human capital theory and both the signaling and option value theory. 
But they are inconsistent with the endogeneity theory. 
The results above also suggest that compulsory schooling laws lowered inequality in 
education since they increased the education level only of those at the bottom of the 
distribution. To evaluate this hypothesis I decompose the variance of education into the 
effects of shifts in composition (i.e. the number of individuals living under a given law), and 
the shifts in education within and between law categories (see Juhn, Murphy and Pierce, 
1993.) The total decline in the variance of education from 1915 to 1939 was 2.52. Panel A of 
Table 8 shows that in fact a very large part of this decline in the variance can be explained by 
changes in the number of individuals living under given laws (i.e. composition effects). But 
note that since these changes in composition are due to many factors, these calculations are 
merely suggestive. 
So, I now estimate the effect of the laws on inequality using the 75-25 range
37 and the 
variance of education as measures of inequality using regression analysis, and controlling for 
all the other state-level characteristics. The results (Panel B Table 8) show that the effect of 
childlaw on the 75-25 range is negative and significant. The effect on the variance is negative   18
but not statistically significant. During this period, the interquartile range (75-25 range) fell 
by approximately 1.5 years (from 4.3 in 1915 to 2.83 in 1939), the variance of education fell 
by 2.5 and childcom increased by a little more than 2 years. The regression coefficients imply 
that about 14% of the decline in the interquartile range and 6% of the decline in the variance 
can be explained by the changes in compulsory schooling and child labor laws. The effect is 
larger for the interquartile range because it does not capture the shifts in the 90
th percentile.  
Note that Goldin and Margo (1992) find that the variance in school quality also 
declined during the first half of the 20
th century. These two effects (decreasing variance of 
school attainment and of school quality) might indeed be related: by passing compulsory 
schooling laws states forced themselves to provide public schools, and thus to raise the level 
of educational expenditures (to both enforce the laws and guarantee school availability).  
6.Were the laws endogenous?  
Although most researchers find that the laws positively affected education levels, they 
are skeptical to conclude that the effect is causal. As has been pointed out in section 4 and 5, 
it is possible that higher enrollments permitted higher minimum ages to be instituted by the 
legislature—causality could thus run from education to the laws and not vice-versa.  
States where attainment was high were also probably states where the laws were 
stringent: individuals in those states might have stronger preferences for education. Indeed, 
Goldin and Katz (1997) show that the Far West, the Great Plains, and parts of New England 
led in secondary education from 1910 to 1940, while the South lagged. Those regions also 
had more stringent laws (Panel A Table 9). Therefore a first attempt to address this issue 
consists in estimating separate regressions by region (Panel B Table 9).  The effect of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
37 This interquartile measure seems the most appropriate for a couple of reasons. First, the results above suggest 
that the largest effects were not at the absolute bottom of the distribution (i.e. the 10
th percentile). Also note that   19
childlaw on education is still significant, although it was much larger in the North than 
anywhere else, and it is insignificant in the West. Interestingly, continuation school laws 
were effective in the northern and southern states but not in the rest of the country. The 
results suggest that although there were indeed large differences within the US, the laws were 
effective within regions as well. However it is still possible that even within regions there 
were important differences between states. 
Landes and Solomon—the only researchers that address directly this endogeneity 
issue, propose an alternative test: if the laws are truly exogenous, then laws passed in a given 
year should not explain the level of enrollments ten years earlier. They estimate 1870 
enrollment levels using the 1880 laws as explanatory variables, and they find that the 1880 
laws are significant and therefore endogenous.  
To perform this test I follow Landes and Solomon and estimate the effect of future 
laws on current attainment by matching individuals both to laws that were in place when they 
were 14 and to laws that were in place when they were too old to have been affected by them. 
I therefore estimate two equations: one that includes the current law and a second that 
includes the future law. Unlike Landes and Solomon, I match individuals to laws not only 10 
years into the future but to every period between 3
38 and 12 years ahead. I examine the effect 
on the educational attainment of people who were 14 in 1925 of laws passed in 1925, and of 
laws passed in 1928, 1929, etc. when they were 15, 16, 17...24 and laws governing 
attendance at 14 should no longer have affected their educational attainment (Landes and 
Solomon use a 10 year lead because their estimates compare cohorts across decennial 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the effect of the laws on the 90
th percentile is positive and significant: it is unclear why this is the case. 
38 No states had set work permit ages at age 17. Therefore matching individuals to the laws that were in place at 
that age should have no effect. The same is not true for ages 15 and 16, since some states did have work permit 
for those ages (see Table 2).   20
censuses). So, in Table 10, the row labeled “3 years”, childlaw refers to the current laws, and 
future childlaw refers to the laws passed three years later. I estimate these regressions at the 
state and cohort level, and restrict the sample to those states for which there were changes 
during the time interval. Regardless of the time span chosen (except for the 10-year span) the 
current laws are always significant whereas the future laws are not. When L&S perform this 
test, they find that laws passed 10 years after an individual's effective age are correlated with 
attainment.  When I perform this test, I find that laws passed 3-9, 11, or 12 years later are not 
correlated with attainment. Interestingly, these results also suggest that the laws were 
relatively more effective in the earlier part of the period.
39  
Curiously, I do find an effect when I use a ten-year lead. Age misreporting could 
explain this result. Oppenheim and Cope (1987) show that in the 1900 census when age and 
birth date do not coincide (and the difference between them is more than one year), 75% of 
the time the reported age and the age implied by the date of birth will differ by 10, 20, 30 or 
40 years. Their results further suggest these discrepancies occur because census interviewers 
recorded the wrong leading digit of age or decade of birth. Measurement error in age might 
therefore explain Landes and Solomon’s results since this problem was more severe in the 
last century. 
5. Conclusions 
  This paper has shown that there were two types of laws that contributed to the 
increase in educational attainment from 1915 to 1939: the laws which specified the age at 
which a child had to enter school, and the laws which specified the age at which a child could 
obtain a work permit. Increasing the number of years a child had to attend school was shown 
                                                           
39 The coefficient on the current law is increasing as the sample is restricted. As the lead increases, the 
observations kept in the sample correspond to older cohorts.   21
to increase years of education by about 5%. These laws affected white men and women 
equally but had no effect on blacks. They were more effective in the southern and northern 
states than in the rest of the country. Continuation school laws, which forced working 
children to attend school on a part-time basis, affected only white males and those born in the 
northern and southern states of the US. The laws had an impact not only on average 
educational attainment but also on the distribution of education as a whole. They 
substantially contributed to the decrease of educational inequality by increasing the education 
level of the lower percentiles of the distribution of education. Not only were these laws 
effective, this paper has also shown that these laws were not endogenous during the 1915-
1939 period.  
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TABLE 2: Tabulations of Laws Across States 
Compulsory Attendance Laws               
                         
Age at which    Age at which can    Education required 
Must enter school    Dropout of school    to be exempt 
  1915  1928 1939      1915 1928 1939     1915  1928  1939 
6 0  2  2    12 2       0  24  3  3 
7 16 28  33    14  4  5  4   4 1 0  0 
8 25 17  13    15  8  3  1   5 0 1  1 
9 1  1  0    16  26 30 35    6  2 2  2 
         17  0 5 3    7  2  1  4 
         18  1 5 5    8  19  37  31 
         20  1       12  0  4  7 
Total  42  48 48    Total  42 48 48    Total  48  48  48 
                     
Child Labor Laws                     
                         
Minimun age to get work permit    Education required for work permit     
  1915  1928 1939      1915 1928 1939          
12 2       0  33  12  10          
13 1       4  1  2  2         
14  38  42  32  5  5  4  3           
15  4 4  4    6 5  8  8         
16  0  2  12  7  1  4  2           
         8  3  18  23          
Total  45  48 48    Total  48 48 48          
 
Continuation School Laws            
               
Have Continuation School Laws    Age until must continue continuation school   
 1915  1928  1939     1915  1928  1939   
0 36 20 19    16 9  16  15   
1 12 28 29    17 1  1  2   
         18  0  11  12   
Total 48  48  48   Total 10  28  29   
 
Constructed variables: Number of years 
     
Childlaw = work age  - enter age    Comlaw = Leave age  - enter age   
  1915 1928 1939      1915 1928  1939   
0 8        0 6       
4 1        4 2       
5 2  1      6 2  4     
6 21 15  9    7 6  2  4   
7 14 26 23    8 21 12  11   
8  2 5 7    9  9  20  25   
9     8    10  1 8  5   
10   1  1    11   1  2   
        12  1  1  1   
Total  48 48 48    Total  48 48  48     28
TABLE 3: Effect of Compulsory Attendance And Child Labor Laws on Education 
Variables   (1)  (2)  (3)
  (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent  Variable  Education        
Education Laws  Age at which must enter school      -0.048**      -0.045* 
      (0.022)     (0.024) 
  Age at which can dropout of school            0.005 
         (0.015) 
  Comlaw = Leaving age - entering age        0.008  0.008   
       (0.009) (0.009)   
  Education required to dropout          0.000  0.000 
       (0.004)  (0.004) 
  Age for Work Permit      0.065**       
      (0.011)      
  Childlaw = Work age – Enter age  0.051**  0.050**         
   (0.01)  (0.01)      
  Education Required for Work permit    0.004  0.005       
     (0.004)  (0.004)     
  Continuation School required (=1)  0.047  0.048  0.046  0.024  0.024  0.025 
    (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
Individual  Female  0.186** 0.186** 0.183** 0.186** 0.186** 0.182** 
characteristics   (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
  Black  -2.109** -2.109** -2.083** -2.109** -2.109** -2.083** 
   (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) 
 Other  Race  -1.714** -1.714** -1.698**  -1.714  -1.714**  -1.714** 
   (0.187) (0.187) (0.188) (0.188) (0.188) (0.187) 
  Parents foreign born  -0.763** -0.763** -0.761**  -0.763  -0.763**  -0.761** 
   (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
State-of-Birth  %  Urban  0.028** 0.028** 0.027** 0.031** 0.032** 0.032** 
Characteristics   (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
  %  Foreign  0.014 0.014 0.013 0.019 0.019 0.015 
    (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) 
  %  Black  0.000 -0.001 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.007 
    (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) 
  % Employed in manufacturing  -0.589  -0.534  -0.818  -0.954  -0.954  -1.318 
    (0.527) (0.525) (0.672) (0.540) (0.540) (0.638) 
  Annual Manufacturing wage  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
  Value of farm per acre  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
  Per capita number of doctors  165.51*  162.89*  162.05*  204*  203.31*  192.49* 
    (96.248) (96.089) (96.287) (105.89) (105.72) (102.43) 
  Per capita education expenditures  0.001**  0.001**  0.001**  0.001**  0.001**  0.001** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
  Number of school buildings per sq. mile -0.012  -0.069  -0.097  -0.289  -0.295  -0.198 
    (0.336) (0.340) (0.339) (0.346) (0.351) (0.353) 
 R-Squared  0.15  0.15  0.1458  0.1499  0.1499  0.146 
  N  478591 478591 475049 478591 478591 475366 
  F-statistic on laws  13.58**  9.26**  9.92**  0.60  0.4  1.24 
All regressions include state-of-birth dummies, cohort dummies region-of-birth*cohort dummies and an 
intercept. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the state-of-birth and cohort level. 
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.   29
TABLE 4: Effect of Laws on Education. Specification Checks 
 
   States  with 
laws only
8 cohorts  Non-movers  1950 
Census 
          
Dependent variable  Education         
          
Education  Childlaw = Work age-enter age  0.062**  0.048**  0.042**  0.046** 
Laws   (0.010)  (0.017)  (0.009)  (0.014) 
  Continuation School Required (=1)  0.044  0.083  0.056  0.058 
   (0.037)  (0.063)  (0.036)  (0.053) 
          
  R-Squared 0.1458  0.1569  0.1576  0.1538 
  Number of observations  475049  151553  306299  152270 
  F-statistic on Laws  19.26**  4.69**  10.08**  6.18** 
Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust. All coefficients derived from regressions that use the same 
controls as in Table 3. 
 
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%  30
TABLE 5: Effect of Laws on Education by gender and race 
 
Variables    White males  White females  Black males  Black females 
Dependent  Education      
Variable        
        
Education  Childlaw = Work age-enter age  0.046**  0.062**  0.014  -0.023 
laws    (.014) (.011) (.028) (.022) 
  Continuation School Required (=1)  0.085*  0.004  0.039  0.104 
    (.050) (.043) (.158) (.119) 
Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust. All coefficients derived from regressions that use the same 
controls as in Table 3. 
 
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
   31
TABLE 6: Why were the laws passed? 
 
Dependent variable  Work Permit 
age 




        
Independent variables         
       
Education 0.176*  -0.034  0.022  0.392** 
 (0.104)  (0.0309)  (0.021)  (0.135) 
% urban  0.011  -0.017**  0.020**  0.036 
 (0.017)  (0.007)  (0.004)  (0.024) 
% foreign  -0.019  -0.058**  0.005  0.102** 
 (0.025)  (0.013)  (0.009)  (0.040) 
% black  -0.112**  -0.040**  0.084**  -0.202** 
 (0.045)  (0.015)  (0.011)  (0.063) 
% employed in manufacturing  -2.891  -0.844  0.201  -5.662 
 (2.848)  (1.044)  (0.586)  (3.662) 
Annual Manufacturing wage  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Value of farm per acre  0.001**  -0.001**  0.000*  0.002** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
Per capita number of doctors  44.740  -187.7**  207.19**  -83.562 
 (222.909)  (85.549)  (105.538)  (298.50) 
Per capita expenditures on education 0.000  0.001**  0.000  -0.000 
 (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.002) 
# of school buildings per sq. mile  -1.495  2.588**  2.238**  -5.777** 
 (1.131)  (0.773)  (0.426)  (1.699) 
        
R-squared 0.4846  0.7614  0.836  0.562 
All regressions include state-of-birth dummies, cohort dummies region-of-birth*cohort dummies and an 
intercept. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the state-of-birth and cohort level. 
 




Note: In this graph the i
th percentile refers to the average i
th percentile across states rather than to the i
th 
percentile of the entire U.S. distribution. 
 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   34
TABLE 8: Effects of the distribution of compulsory schooling laws on inequality 
 
Panel A: Within and between decomposition of the variance in education 
 
  Within variation    Between variation 
          
total change  variance effect composition effect    education changes  composition effect 
          
-2.522512 -3.664  1.339567   22.82157  -23.02284 
 
Notes: These calculations were computed as follows: 
 
( ) ( ) () ( ) () ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ − ∆ + ∆ − ∆ + − + − = − + + + + + + +
i




it it it it it
i










1 σ σ σ σ σ  
where σt
2 is the variance of education for cohort t, Pit is the proportion of individuals under compulsory law i in cohort t, and ∆et
2=(eit 
–et )
2 , where et is the average level of education for cohort t. The first sum in the expression is the variance effect, the second sum is 
the composition effect. The first and second sums constitute the total within variation change. The third sum captures changes in 
education. The third term captures changes in Pit so again this is a composition effect. The third and fourth sums constitute the total 
between variation.  
 
 
Panel B: Effect of the laws on inequality measures using regression analysis  
 
Variables     
Dependent variable  percentile of the distribution of education  75-25 Range  Education Variance
      
      
Laws Childlaw =  Work age - enter age  -0.093**  -0.079 
   (0.023)  (0.058) 
      
Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust. All coefficients derived from regressions that use the same 
controls as in Table 3. Sample:Whites. 
 
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.   35
TABLE 9: Results by Region 
 
Variables   South  North  Midwest  West 
  Panel A: Means 
        
  Education  8.924  10.564 10.748 10.988 
L a w s         
  Childlaw = Work age-enter age  6.283  6.929  7.067  6.364 
  Work  Age  13.822 14.302 14.267 14.278 
  Enter  Age  7.413 7.373 7.200 7.676 
  Continuation School Required (=1)  0.273  0.556  0.607  0.662 
        
  Panel  B: Regression Results 
        
  Dependent  Variable:  Education      
        
Education  Childlaw = Work age-enter age  0.036**  0.092**  0.039**  0.044 
laws    (.014) (.022) (.019) (.026) 
  Continuation School Required (=1)  0.153**  0.190*  -0.085  -0.023 
    (.057) (.105) (.053) (.111) 
Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust. All coefficients derived from regressions that use the same 
controls as in Table 3. Sample includes all individuals. 
 
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.  36
TABLE 10: Endogeneity Test 
Dependent Variable  Average Education     
   Explanatory  Variable 
Lead Statistics  Childlaw Future  Childlaw 
      
3 years  β  .019 -.020 
 s.e.  (.020)  (.021) 
 N  316  316 
      
4 years  β  .036** -.008 
  s.e. (.018)  (.027) 
 N  352  352 
      
5 years  β  .033** .036 
 s.e.  (.016)  (.023) 
 N  384  384 
      
6 years  β  .044** .018 
  s.e. (.017)  (.020) 
 N  414  414 
     
7 years  β  .047** .013 
 s.e.  (.017)  (.019) 
 N  419  419 
      
8 years  β  .055** .035* 
  s.e. (.016)  (.020) 
 N  417  417 
     
9 years  β  .053** -.010 
 s.e.  (.017)  (.032) 
 N  403  403 
     
10 years  β  .053** .058** 
  s.e. (.018)  (.025) 
 N  360  360 
     
11 years  β  .046** -.012 
 s.e.  (.012)  (.031) 
 N  315  315 
      
12 years  β  .037* -.049 
  s.e. (.019)  (.034) 
 N  274  274 
All β come from different regressions. The regressions include the same variables as in Table 3. The 
standard errors  (in parenthesis) are robust. 
** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level  37
Appendix A: Sources of Data for Compulsory Attendance Laws and Child Labor Laws 
 
 
Year  Compulsory Attendance Laws  Child Labor Laws 
    
1915  US Department of Labor, Children’s Bureau,  -US Department of Labor, Children’s Bureau, 
  Child Labor Legislation in the United States,  Child Labor Legislation in the United States, 
  Publication No. 10 by Sumner, Helen L. and Ella  Publication No. 10 by Sumner, Helen L. and Ella 
  A. Merrit, Washington: US GPO 1915  A. Merrit, Washington: US GPO 1915 
 Reviewed  with:   
  -US Office of Education. State Law on  
  Compulsory Attendance Circular No. 793 by   
  August W. Steinhilber and Carl J. Sokolowsky,   
  US GPO 1966   
1918  Department of the Interior. Bureau of Education,  Department of the Interior. Bureau of Education, 
  Biennial Survey of Education 1916-1918,  Biennial Survey of Education 1916-1918, Bulletin 
  Bulletin No. 90, 191 Washington: US GPO 1921  No. 90, 191 Washington: US GPO 1921 
 Reviewed  with:   
  -U.S. Department of Health, Education, and   
 Welfare.  Compulsory School Attendance and  
  Minimum Educational Requirements in the  
  United States, Circular 440 by W. W. Keesecker.   
  Washington: US GPO 1955   
1921  U.S Department of Labor, Children’s Bureau.  U.S Department of Labor, Children’s Bureau and 
  State Compulsory Attendance Standards  Federal Board for Vocational Education. Child 
  Affecting the Employment of Minors. Chart No. 2  Care and Child Welfare. Federal Board for 
  Washington: US GPO 1921  Vocational Education, Home Economics Series 
    No.5. Bulletin No.65, Washington GPO 1921 
1924  U.S Department of Labor, Children’s Bureau.  U.S Department of Labor, Children’s Bureau. 
  State Compulsory Attendance Standards  State Child-Labor Standards. Chart No. 1 
  Affecting the Employment of Minors. Chart No. 2  Washington: US GPO 1924 
  Washington: US GPO 1924   
1928  US Department of the Interior, Bureau of  US Department of the Interior, Bureau of 
 Education.  Laws Relating to Compulsory Education.  Laws Relating to Compulsory 
  Education. Bulletin No. 20 by Ward W.  Education. Bulletin No. 20 by Ward W. 
  Keesecker, US GPO 1929  Keesecker, US GPO 1929 
1929  US Department of Labor, Children’s Bureau.  US Department of Labor, Children’s Bureau. 
  Child Labor: Facts and Figures. Bulletin No.  Child Labor: Facts and Figures. Bulletin No. 197. 
  197. Washington: US GPO, 1930  Washington: US GPO, 1930 
1930  U.S Department of Labor, Children’s Bureau.  U.S Department of Labor, Children’s Bureau. 
  State Compulsory Attendance Standards  State Child-Labor Standards. Chart No. 1 
  Affecting the Employment of Minors. Chart No. 2  Washington: US GPO 1930 
  Washington: US GPO 1930   
1935  US Department of the Interior, Office of  US Department of the Interior, Office of 
 Education.  Compulsory School Attendance Laws Education.  Compulsory School Attendance Laws 
  and Their Administration.  Bulletin No. 4 by W  and Their Administration.  Bulletin No. 4 by W W 
  W Keesecker and W S Deffebaugh, US GPO  Keesecker and W S Deffebaugh, US GPO 1935 
 1935     38
 
Appendix A continued 
Year  Compulsory Schooling Laws  Child Labor Laws 
1939  - US Office of Education, Pupil Personnel  
  Education, Bulletin No.6, 1940, Monograph 5   
 (1918-1939)   
  -U.S. Department of Health, Education, and   
 Welfare.  Compulsory School Attendance and  
  Minimum Educational Requirements in the  
  United States, Circular 440 by W. W. Keesecker.   
  Washington: US GPO 1955   
 
Further Notes: Information about following variables was not available in the cited publications: 
-1918: continuation school laws. 
-1929: Entrance age 
-1939: Education to dropout, Education to work and Continuation school 
 
Years in between were imputed using the previous laws. However, for certain years, I used additional 
information to correct certain variables: 
1916: corrected Entrance age,  Leaving age,  Education to dropout and Work permit age using U.S 
Department of Labor, Children’s Bureau. Summary of Child-Welfare Laws passed in 1916. Bureau 
Publication No. 21. US GPO 1917. 
1923: corrected Entrance age, Leaving age and Education to dropout, using US Office of Education, 
Bulletin No.2, US GPO 1925 
1925: corrected Leaving age and Continuation school using U.S Department of Labor, Children’s Bureau. 
Important Legislative Changes Made in 1925 in Child Labor Standards and In Compulsory School 
Attendance Standards Affecting the Employment of Minors. 
1926 and 1927: corrected Education to work using U.S Department of Labor, Children’s Bureau. Child 
Labor and Compulsory School Attendance Measures passed by the state Legislatures meeting in 1926 and 
1927. 
1936: corrected Work permit age using U.S Department of Labor, Children’s Bureau. Child Labor. US 
GPO 1936 
1937: corrected Work permit age, Entrance age, Leaving age and Education to dropout using U.S 
Department of Labor, Children’s Bureau. Child Welfare Legislation, 1937, Bureau Publication No. 236, US 
GPO 1938 
1939: corrected Work permit age using: Merrit, Ella A., “Trend of Child Labor, 1937 to 1939”, Monthly 
Labor Review. January 1940 
 
Definitions of various compulsory education and child labor variables 
 
Entrance age: maximum at which a child must enter school 
Leaving age: minimum age at which a child can leave school 
Education to dropout: years of schooling needed to be exempted from school according to compulsory 
attendance laws 
Work permit age: Minimum Age at which can obtain a work permit 
Education to work: years of schooling needed to obtain a work permit 
Continuation school = 1 if state required children that were exempted from school or that had a work 
permit to attend continuation, evening or part time school. Compulsory evening school was included, 
unless it was required only of illiterate individuals. 
Continuation school age: Age until which child had to attend continuation school 
Comlaw = leaving age-entrance age: implied years of compulsory schooling according to compulsory 
attendance laws. 
Childlaw = work permit age-entrance age: implied years of compulsory schooling according to child labor 
laws   39
Appendix B: State Level Data 
 
-Data on education expenditures and number of schools buildings per state comes from several 
years of the Biennial Survey of Education. The data was exits for even years, starting in 1916. 
Fortunately earlier data for 1914 also exits and was published in the Statistical Abstract of the 
United States. Data for years in between was imputed using a linear interpolation. 
-Data about the percentage of population employed in manufacturing and wages in the 
manufacturing sector comes from the Census of Manufactures. It was collected every two year 
and is available for all odd years. Data for years in between was imputed using linear 
interpolation. 
-Data on the percentage of the population that lived in urban areas, percentage of black 
population and percentage white foreign born come from the census and it is only available every 
ten years. Data for years in between was imputed using a linear interpolation by state. 
-Data on average value of farm property per farm and per acre of farm land was reported in the 
Statistical Abstract of the United States for 1910, 1920, 1925, 1930 and 1940. Data for years in 
between was generated using a linear interpolation by state. 
-Data about states’ population comes from the Statistical Abstract of the United States. Accurate 
measures are only available every ten years from the Census, but estimates for every year where 
published as well. These estimates are used to calculate all the per capita measures, when per 
capita measures where not already available. 
-Data on infant mortality rates comes form the National Vital Statistics. The state time series 
going form 1915 to 1950 were published in1950. Data for early years was not available for all 
states. Missing values were imputed using a linear trend by state. 
-Data on number of hospitals and physicians comes from several years of the American Medical 
Directory published every year since 1906 by the American Medical Association. Data is 
available at the state level for the following years: 1906, 1909, 1912, 1914, 1916, 1918, 1921, 
1923, 1925, 1927, 1929, 1931, 1934, 1936, 1938, 1940 (and beyond). Missing values were 
imputed using linear interpolation. 
-All monetary values (education expenditures, manufacturing wages, net income and farm value) 
were converted into real dollars using the Consumer Price Index series provided by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics online at ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt. 1982-84 is the base 
period. 
-Measurement units: Population: in thousands; number employed in manufacturing: actual 
number; wages in manufacturing: in thousands; net income: in thousands; number of school 
buildings:  actual number; expenditures in education: in thousands; number of farms: actual 
number; value of farm property: in thousands; all land in farms: in thousands. 
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Apendix C: Summary Statistics. Individual Level Data 
 
Variable   Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
         
Dependent  Years of completed education  478591  10.16  3.44  0  18 
        
Education  Age at which can leave school  475366  15.81  1.03  12.00  20 
Laws  Age at which must enter school  475366  7.35  0.56  6.00  9 
 Comlaw = leave-enter  478591  8.39  1.47  0  12 
 Childlaw = Work age-enter age  478591  6.81  1.25  0  10 
  Education required to dropout  478591  6.63  3.35  0  12 
  Minimum Age for Work Permit  477420  14.22  0.88  7.00  18 
  Education required for Work Permit  478591  4.94  3.05  0  8 
  Continuation School Required (=1)  478591  0.62  0.48  0  1 
         
Individual female  478591  0.51  0.50  0  1 
characteristics black  478591  0.10  0.29  0  1 
 Other  race  478591  0.00  0.06 0  1 
  Parents foreign born  478591  0.16  0.37  0  1 
         
State %  urban  478591  51.49 21.70 12.30 97.50 
Characteristics  %  foreign  478591  10.98 8.64  0.40 31.30 
  %  black  478591  10.95  13.64 0.01 54.20 
  % employed in manufacturing  478591  0.06  0.04  0.00  0.28 
  Annual Manufacturing wage  478591 6986.18 1465.96  713.03 12095.16 
  Value of farm per acre  478591  521.88  275.75  47.70  1802.58 
  Per capita number of doctors  478591  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
  Per capita expenditures on 
education 
478591  92.29 42.83  5.37 601.39 
  # of school buildings per sq. mile  478591  0.17  0.09  0.00  0.47 
Sample: All people born in the 48 states between 1901 and 1925 whose educational attainment is not 
missing from the 1960 Census. 
 